Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction Venue and Clarification Act by Baude, William
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2012
Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction Venue
and Clarification Act
William Baude
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Baude, "Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction Venue and Clarification Act," 110 Michigan Law Review First
Impressions 33 (2012).
Baude FTP FI_C.doc 1/25/2012 1:16 PM 
33 
CLARIFICATION NEEDED: FIXING 
THE JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
CLARIFICATION ACT 
William Baude* 
One hates to seem ungrateful. Judges and scholars frequently call for 
Congress to fix problems in the law of jurisdiction and procedure, and Con-
gress doesn’t usually intervene. In that light, the Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act (“JVCA”),1 signed into law on December 7, 2011, ought to 
be a welcome improvement. And hopefully, on balance, it will be. But in at 
least one area that it attempts to clarify, the JVCA leaves much to be de-
sired. 
Professor Arthur Hellman has called the JVCA “the most far-reaching 
package of revisions to the Judicial Code since the Judicial Improvements 
Act of 1990.”2 The Act addresses a variety of removal issues—including 
unrelated federal and state claims, multiple defendants, removal of criminal 
cases, and the amount in controversy—and makes several major changes to 
the law of venue. This essay addresses one of those removal issues: the 
amount in controversy in a case removed from state court. I argue that there 
are at least three respects in which the JVCA failed to adequately clarify the 
law of diversity removal jurisdiction. 
I. The Removal Problem 
Federal jurisdiction in diversity cases requires that “the matter in contro-
versy exceed[] . . . $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”3 When the 
plaintiff files the lawsuit in federal court in the first instance, this is easy to 
establish. The complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and will typically demand at least that 
much money, plus allege facts sufficient to establish that such a sum might 
be recoverable.4 
                                                                                                                      
 * Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, Stanford Law School. I appreciate prompt and 
helpful comments from Judge David Hamilton, Arthur Hellman, Judith Miller, and Stephen 
Sachs. 
 1. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63 
(Dec. 7, 2011). 
 2. Arthur Hellman, Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act, Prawfsblawg, 
Dec. 2, 2011, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/12/updated-jurisdiction-and-
venue-clarification- act.html. The committee report described Hellman as instrumental in 
crafting the removal provisions. Report of the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. 112-10, 
at 2 [hereinafter “Committee Report”]. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
 4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
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But when the defendant seeks to remove a case that has started out in 
state court (which he can do so long as the case could have been filed in 
federal court, and so long as he acts promptly), two complications arise. 
One is that the complaint will have been designed to comply with state laws 
of form, not federal laws. In many states there is no requirement that the 
complaint demand a particular sum of money.5 Even if there is a stated 
amount, it is not necessarily a binding cap on the plaintiff’s recovery.6 Some 
states even forbid the naming of a specific sum, apparently believing that 
lawyers will vie for publicity by naming irresponsible amounts.7 
The second complication is that the plaintiff has no incentive to establish 
a large amount in controversy, because it is the defendant who seeks federal 
jurisdiction. One should therefore not expect the complaint to contain the 
information necessary to decide whether there is jurisdiction to remove the 
case. Yet it is not always clear what other evidence there will be, or what 
authority to give such evidence when it exists.  
The result has not been a model of jurisdictional simplicity. While two 
federal appeals court opinions—McPhail v. Deere and Meridian v. 
Sadowski—have attempted to bring clarity to the doctrine,8 the leading fed-
eral practice treatise notes that federal courts have articulated at least eight 
different ways of analyzing the defendant’s burden of establishing federal 
jurisdiction, optimistically adding that it “is doubtful that these different 
verbal formulae represent a significant variation in practice.”9 The JVCA’s 
Committee Report similarly notes “differing standards” in the federal courts 
(without the optimism).10 Even if all courts adjudicate these cases in the 
same way—which a scan of a hundred district court decisions leads me to 
doubt—it is surely only after a great deal of effort and some amount of good 
fortune. 
The JVCA provides several rules in an attempt to solve this removal 
problem. As an initial matter, the amount named “in good faith” in the plain-
tiff’s complaint “shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.”11 
However, the defendant can assert a different amount in controversy in the 
notice of removal if the complaint seeks nonmonetary relief, or if “State 
practice either does not permit a demand for a specific sum or permits re-
                                                                                                                      
 5. See, e.g., Ala. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. The 
examples are discussed in Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the 
Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff ’s Complaint: The 
Need for Judicial and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal 
Courts, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 681, 686–87 (1997).  
 6. Noble-Allgire, supra note 5, at 692. 
 7. E.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Ind. R. Trial P. 8(a); N.J. R. Civ. Prac. 4:5-2; S.C. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a); Wis. Stat. § 802.02(1m); see also Noble-Allgire, supra note 5, at 688–89. 
 8. McPhail v. Deere, 529 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2008); Meridian v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 
536 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 9. 14A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3702.2 (4th ed.). 
 10. Committee Report, supra note 2, at 15. 
 11. JVCA § 103(b)(3)(C), to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). 
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covery of damages in excess of the amount demanded.”12 If the defendant 
has asserted an amount in controversy in the notice of removal, the district 
court must “find[] by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in 
controversy exceeds” $75,000.13  
The Act also makes two modifications to the deadlines for removal. It 
clarifies that if the defendant discovers for the first time that the case is re-
movable through “information relating to the amount in controversy in the 
record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery,” he has thirty 
days to remove the case. Further, if “the district court finds that the plaintiff 
deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent 
removal,” it allows a “bad faith” extension to the one-year maximum dead-
line for notices of removal.14  
II. The Incompleteness of the JVCA 
These provisions are improvements, yet incomplete in at least three im-
portant respects. First, the JVCA provides no rule when state law permits 
but does not require the plaintiff to name a specific dollar amount. Recall 
that the JVCA allows the defendant to assert his own assessment of the 
amount in controversy only if state practice “does not permit a demand for a 
specific sum” or “permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount de-
manded.” When state law is permissive, and the plaintiff doesn’t name a 
dollar figure, neither provision is triggered: state law does “permit” specific 
demands, and there is no “amount demanded.” Unfortunately, there are 
many states whose practice falls into this category.15 
Second, even when the defendant is permitted to assert his own amount 
in controversy, the statute adopts a “preponderance of the evidence” stand-
ard without explaining what that standard means. Some courts treat the 
preponderance standard as if it expressed a presumption of narrow construc-
tion against removal jurisdiction.16 McPhail and Meridian criticized that 
view and instead interpreted the standard to apply only to “contested facts” 
that might be relevant to the amount in controversy, whereas “once those 
underlying facts are proven, a defendant . . . is entitled to stay in federal 
court unless it is ‘legally certain’ that less than $75,000 is at stake.”17 The 
Committee Report suggests that the bill was intended to codify the rule in 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Id., to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 
 13. Id., to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). 
 14. Id., §§ 103(b)(3)(B), (C), to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), (c)(1), (c)(3)(B). 
I discuss these deadlines further in a few paragraphs. 
 15. See supra note 5. 
 16. See, e.g., Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 F. App’x 62, 65 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by 
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010); Armour v. Transamerica Life Ins., No. 11–
2034, 2011 WL 1699281 (D. Kan. May 4, 2011); Buffington v. Home Depot USA, No. 10-cv-
01933, 2010 WL 3307368 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2010); see also Meridian v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 
536, 542 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting other district courts that had imposed such a burden). 
 17. McPhail, 529 F.3d at 954; accord Meridian, 441 F.3d at 543. 
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McPhail and Meridian (a welcome solution by my lights).18 But that inten-
tion is expressed only in the Committee Report, and many judges are 
reluctant to give too much weight to such legislative history instead of to the 
statute’s text.19 If Congress really meant it, they could have inserted the 
holding of those cases explicitly into the statute. 
Third, however one interprets the preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard, the JVCA does little to address the problem that such evidence can be 
hard to come by within the schedule of the removal deadlines. As McPhail 
explained, 
in most removal cases, there is little ‘evidence’ one way or another. In 
most cases, the defendant must file a notice of removal within thirty days 
after receiving the complaint. Pre-removal discovery in state court is un-
likely to have produced helpful information by then . . . . And if the plain-
plaintiff moves quickly to challenge removal in federal court, there may 
not be time to produce more evidence in federal discovery before the court 
decides to rule.20 
The evidence problem is exacerbated by the fact that the defendant must 
work within a set of shifting deadlines and two discovery regimes. The de-
fendant’s deadline to file a notice of removal is thirty days from the point at 
which he first discovers that the case is removable—perhaps from reading 
the initial complaint, perhaps from subsequent discovery about the plain-
tiff’s case in state court.21 When the complaint does not demand a specific 
sum (or demands a “lowball,” nonbinding sum), the defendant is in a bit of a 
bind. The defendant is only supposed to wait for additional information “if 
the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.”22 Yet the case stated 
by the initial pleading may well be removable (it certainly does not rule out 
damages above $75,000); the problem is that the defendant may not be suf-
ficiently certain that he will be able to prove it. So if the defendant waits to 
remove until subsequent interrogatories in state court confirm the extent of 
the plaintiff’s claim, he may well be too late.23 
The JVCA’s solution to this problem is inadequate. The section provid-
ing that “information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of 
the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an 
‘other paper’ under [§ 1446](b)(3)”24 (which would restart the removal 
clock) helps resolve a split over whether depositions and similar documents 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Committee Report, supra note 2, at 16. 
 19. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 
 20. McPhail, 529 F.3d at 953–54. 
 21. JVCA § 103(b)(3)(B), to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B), (b)(3). 
 22. Id., to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). 
 23. E.g., TIC-The Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 09-763, 2009 WL 1796071 (D. Colo. 
June 23, 2009) (defendant should have removed earlier). 
 24. JVCA § 103(b)(3)(C), to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1), (c)(3)(B). 
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constitute “other paper.”25 But it does not deal with the fundamental dead-
line problem, because it is triggered only if “the case stated by the initial 
pleading is not removable.”26 The other section creating a bad faith excep-
tion to the one-year outside deadline for removal27 will presumably rein in 
some abusive practices, but it is still an exception only to the outside dead-
line. Defendants must also comply with the thirty-day deadline, which has 
no bad faith exception, and which is uncertain even when there is no bad 
faith.  
III. Clarifying the Clarification 
A better version of the bill would not have left these gaps. It would have 
explicitly dealt with states that neither forbid nor require demanding a spe-
cific sum, presumably by including them in the new section 
1446(c)(2)(a)(ii). It would have clarified its use of the preponderance stand-
ard, ideally by providing that only facts (and presumably only facts not 
found in the complaint) need be proven by the preponderance of the evi-
dence, and that the ultimate amount in controversy is any amount that it is 
legally possible to collect on the basis of those facts. And it would have giv-
en the defendant a firmer opportunity to obtain evidence to prove the 
amount in controversy to the district court—perhaps by saying that the de-
fendant need not try to remove the case right away if the complaint does not 
name an amount in controversy,28 by providing the defendant a right to dis-
covery in federal court before the removal petition is resolved,29 or both.  
It is not impossible for creative judicial interpretations of the JVCA to 
fill in these gaps as Congress should have. Courts might think the purpose of 
section 1446(c)(2)(a)(ii) is sufficiently obvious that it should be extended to 
states whose practice does not forbid the naming of specific sums; they 
might find the Committee Report’s endorsement of McPhail and Meridian 
sufficiently persuasive to adopt those cases’ explication of the confusing 
preponderance of the evidence standard; and they might hold that a complaint 
with no named sum is “not removable” for purposes of the time limit,30 or that 
it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse removal without giving 
                                                                                                                      
 25. See Briant S. Platt, Section 1446(b) Federal Removal Jurisdiction and the Thirty-
Day Clock: Should A Motion To Amend Trigger the Time Bomb?, 4 Nev. L.J. 120, 135 n.136 
(2003) (describing split). 
 26. JVCA § 103(c), to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(A). 
 27. Id., to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(c)(1), (c)(3)(B) .  
 28. See, e.g., Noble-Allgire, supra note 5, at 750–51 (proposing statutory language). 
 29. See Committee Report, supra note 2, at 16 (“[D]iscovery may be taken with regard 
to [the amount in controversy].”); McPhail v. Deere, 529 F.3d 947, 954 (10th Cir. 2008) (en-
couraging jurisdictional discovery). But see Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n of N.M. v. Clearlend Sec., 
798 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D.N.M. 2011) (dismissing McPhail as “dicta”). 
 30. See, e.g., Harshey v. Advanced Bionics Corp., No. 09-905, 2009 WL 3617756 (S.D. 
Ind. Oct. 29, 2009) (“The better approach is to require more of a removing defendant and to 
give that defendant a reasonable opportunity to learn more about the scope of the plaintiff's 
claim.”). 
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adequate federal discovery. I do not wish to make the case against those in-
terpretations here, because I hope that courts will indeed find a way to adopt 
them. My point is just that a statute aimed at jurisdictional “clarification” 
should not have left those matters up for grabs.  
To be sure, my criticisms are tentative and limited to just one of the 
JVCA’s several provisions. But if I am right that the JVCA does not ade-
quately solve the problem of the amount in controversy in removal, I worry 
that it may have similar shortcomings in other areas. To paraphrase Ed Hart-
nett’s criticism of the restyled rules of civil procedure, “I don’t have the 
chutzpah to claim that I caught everything [Congress] missed. If [Con-
gress’s] distinguished members [and] advisors . . . missed things that I 
caught, I have to believe that others will catch things that we all missed.”31  
Judge Cardozo once lamented that “the legislature, informed only casu-
ally and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, without 
expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice . . . patches the 
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend.”32 The JVCA, by 
contrast, was prepared with extensive expert help and makes real progress. 
But even experts are subject to political compromise. As the Committee Re-
port explained, more far-reaching reforms were contemplated as part of the 
JVCA—one welcome reform would have allowed the plaintiff to make a 
binding “declaration” that he sought no more than $75,00033—but those 
proposals were rejected after a “vetting process” designed to eliminate 
“provisions that were considered controversial by prominent legal experts 
and advocacy groups.”34 The apparent goal was to limit the bill to pareto-
efficient changes—ones to which nobody could raise a principled objection. 
But if the removal provisions that Congress ultimately adopted are the best 
that can be produced under such limitations, then maybe we cannot really 
restore rationality to the law of federal jurisdiction without embracing some 
more “controversial” proposals. 
                                                                                                                      
 31. Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 155, 164–
65 (2006). 
 32. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1921). 
 33. See 109 H.R. 5440, § 6 (2006); Arthur Hellman, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction 
and Venue Clarification Act: Some Missing Pieces, JURIST (Jan. 4, 2012), http://jurist.org/ 
forum/2012/01/arthur-hellman-jvca-ii.php. 
 34. Committee Report, supra note 2, at 2–3.  
